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Abstract
Information gatekeepers such as Internet search engines and shopbots play a crucial role in the information
society. Recently, such gatekeepers have begun implementing a paid placement strategy, where some content
providers are given, in return for a placement fee, prominent positioning in response to user queries.
Generally, users have disutility toward the bias created by paid placement, and the search engine can
manipulate the placement strategy to affect users disutility. We analyze the gatekeepers tradeoff between
revenue from paid placement and the potential loss in advertising revenue from the loss of credibility.  In the
optimal paid placement strategy, an increase in the gatekeepers quality of service allows it to improve profits
from paid placement, moving it closer to the ideal.  However, an increase in the advertising rate motivates the
gatekeeper to increase market share by reducing further its reliance on paid placement and fraction of paying
providers. When there is competition between search engines of identical quality, they will choose the same
bias level. For heterogeneous search engines with different qualities, the equilibrium outcome depends largely
on the users cognitive or other limitations on the number of search results they effectively consider.
1 INTRODUCTION
Individual and organizational decision makers often turn to advisors (consultants or counsellors) for advice and recommendations,
for help in determining which alternatives to consider or how to rank alternatives. In the case of ordinary individuals or consumers,
first the transportation revolution increased the number of choices available for most decisions (e.g., decisions related to purchase
of goods and services) by removing barriers related to distance, and then the information revolution dramatically increased the
capability of consumers to collect information relevant to the decision. The Internet and World Wide Web present repositories
of informationfrom text to multimedia, from amateur opinions to expert thought, from voluntary contributions to commercial
interestson every conceivable topic. Lawrence and Giles (1999) estimated the publicly indexable Web at 800 million pages,
6 terabytes of text data, on 2.8 million servers, as of February 1999. The average decision maker, whether searching for
information goods or for collateral information related to some other decision or product, is presented today with a huge
consideration space, much too large for unguided or enumerative search. Consequently, the last few years have witnessed
tremendous growth in the area of information gatekeepers. Common examples of information gatekeepers on the Internet include
Internet search engines, comparison shopping systems, recommender systems, and other information systems that filter available
choices for decision makers using databases and algorithms for information retrieval.
We define an information gatekeeper as an information system (usually, but not necessarily, computer-based) that is able to
influence decision-making behavior through its vast repository of relevant information and algorithms for matching elements of
this repository to consumer requirements. The gatekeepers influence on decision-making behavior may manifest in terms of
which alternatives are seriously considered, or perhaps even how the decision maker values certain alternatives. This ability to
influence decisions arises from the gatekeepers expertise related to the decision topic, which allows it to search for, match, and
evaluate alternatives, thereby partially offloading the search and evaluation tasks from the decision maker. These systems are seen
as gatekeepers because it would be nearly impossible for most decision makers to conduct a search and evaluation without the
assistance of such systems. For example, the vast amount of information on the Web would be of little value in the absence of
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effective search engines. Indeed, Internet search engines serve as a gateway to the Webs information repository and have
established a crucial role in todays information society. Most studies of Internet usage find that search engines play a vital role
in information retrieval over the Internet. A recent USA Today (2000) article states that 100 million queries are made on U.S.
search engines each weekday, and a study of Web usage by Jupiter Media Metrix (Sullivan 2002b) found that the top three search
engines were each visited by 61 percent, 56 percent, and 40 percent of tracked Internet users during the previous month.
This paper develops economic models to analyze the occurrence of bias in information gatekeepers. We define bias as the
deliberate perturbation of advice (or a search result) in order to derive monetary gain from a third party (content provider): the
bias manifests itself as a preferential placement of one or more content providers, who anticipate increased gains in a future
transaction with the decision maker as a result of the preferential placement. Bias, or preferential placement, is widespread in
information gatekeepers and found also in many gatekeepers that began as independent, neutral aggregators of information.
Internet search engines and comparison shopping sites (also called shopbots) are illustrative examples. All of the early sites began
as noncommercial independent aggregators of Web content, and came to rely on advertising revenue. In the last few years,
however, the drop in supply of venture capital and the fall in advertising revenues forced search engines to investigate mechanisms
for generating revenue from content providers. These mechanisms, which we generically label as paid placement, include a fee
for inclusion in the database, an increased relevance score in response to a query, or featured listings on the results pages. A paid
placement strategy usually requires a minor modification of the ranking algorithm or to the display of results, either of which can
be made at very low cost. Paid placement is widespread in search engines (e.g., Google), information portals (e.g., Yahoo!),
metasearch engines (e.g., Metacrawler), and shopbots (e.g., MySimon).  Nearly all major search engines and portals employ paid
placement (Sullivan 2002a).  Table 1 presents data on the extent of paid placement for metasearch engines. Figure 1 shows paid
placement, regular listings, and advertising in an Internet search engine (Metacrawler.com) when searching for the keyword
Canada. The top positions of the paid links (featured search results) increase their likelihood of being followed up. But this
preferential listing may create disutility for the consumers.  For example, it might be irrelevant to the users search, but it occupies
a lot of space, or it is actually relevant but the user has extra uncertainty about its relevancy because it is a paid featured result.
Figure 1.  Paid Placement in MetaCrawler.com
Paid 
placement
Regular
listing
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Table 1.  Percentage of Paid Listings
Meta Search Paid Links Total Links % Paid
Dogpile 30 35 86
qbsearch 66 98 67
MetaCrawle 13 25 52
Mamma 6 15 40
Search.com 10 29 34
ProFusion 2 14 14
Ixquick 1 10 10
Vivisimo 0: 20 0
The table shows what percentage of the links shown on the first page of results
from a meta search service were paid listings. The table shows what percentage of
the links shown on the first page of results from a meta search service were paid
listings. The search query was Canada, done using each meta search services
default settings.
The evolution of preferential placement in Internet-based information gatekeepers has followed a similar path as in older forms
of gatekeepers. For example, it is similar to the pay for play practice in radio stations, where commercial radio stations accept
money from record companies and push their music by playing those songs more frequently. The music played on radio stations
influences sales of recorded music, since listeners tend to rely on the expertise of radio deejays. Pay-for-play is a legal practice
today so long as the radio station announces the play with a sponsorship line (Gloede 1993); however, it caused huge controversy
(known as the payola scandal) in the middle of the last century, leading to a conviction, in 1960, of a leading deejay in the United
States for accepting payola.  More recently, several Latin radio stations in the United States have been investigated for illegal
practices involving payment for playing music. The movement of search engines from independent to commercial sites also finds
a parallel in the radio station industry:  while there were only independent radio stations in the beginning,  today there are about
10,000 commercial radio stations in the United States and only about 2,500 independent stations.
In other examples, we see many information gatekeepers that are considered independent (e.g., Consumer Reports, some special
interest recommendation sites on the Internet, academic survey articles such as the OR/MS Today annual survey of major software
products for statistical analysis, decision analysis, linear programming, etc.) and many others that have a general information
aggregation role but provide preferential treatment based on payments (e.g., commercial yellow pages, product analyses in
commercial magazines). In this paper, we view preferential placement (or bias) as just one of several attributes that define the
gatekeepers quality. If consumers are negatively disposed toward preferential placement, then it simply reduces the quality
perception of the gatekeeper, hence downwardly influencing its likely market share. The rest of this paper is organized as follows
and, for ease of discussion, is set in the specific context of Internet search engines. In section 2, we develop our model of the
search engines revenue problem, considering network effects, the effect of paid placement, and third-party revenues. We
characterize the optimal paid placement strategy in section 3, and discuss the sensitivity of the paid placement strategy to various
controllable parameters such as the extent of bias and search engine quality, and other factors such as perceived disutility and the
advertising rate. In section 4, we consider two cases of duopolistic competition, one in which both search engines are identical
and the other in which one is endowed with superior quality. We conclude with a summary of our results and possible application
of our work to other forms of Internet-based information intermediaries.
2 MODEL OF GATEKEEPERS REVENUE PROBLEM
In developing an economic model of gatekeeper, we consider three types of entities: users of the gatekeeper, content providers,
and third-parties such as advertisers and licensing firms. The gatekeeper benefits content providers by providing preferential
placement.
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2.1 Network Effects
We conceptualize the gatekeeper as offering network benefits to both users and content providers. The overall value of the
gatekeeper to users increases in the total number of content providers, and the value to content providers increases in the number
of users. Content providers also face a negative externality when evaluating paid placement: the benefits from paid placement
go down if the gatekeeper also provides preferential placement to many other content providers.
Consider first the market for users of a monopolist gatekeeper. The demand for the search service is determined by the overall
quality of the gatekeeper, which is composed of the extent of bias, and all of the other quality measures other than bias. Let >
represent such a technological or service measure . Let x represent bias level, denoted by the number of paid placement among
all the content providers. Let  $ (>; x) be the relative bias level with respect to its technological features. In general, the more
advanced the technological level or the higher the service level of the gatekeeper, the more consumers can bear higher bias. So
Mx(>; x) < 0,  and M>(>; x) > 0. The demand function M(>; x) is decreasing in the bias level x, while increasing in the other quality
measures >. For simplicity, we use M(>; x) to represent M($ (>; x); x) in most of the rest of the paper. 
The gatekeeper generates revenues on the basis of its user base, including revenues from third-party firms such as advertisers and
fees for licensing their information retrieval technologies. Advertisers are interested in exposure to users of the gatekeeper, hence
advertising revenues are a function of the search engines user base. For simplicity in exposition, we denote all user-based
revenues as advertising revenues. Let s represent the advertising value per user, so that the gatekeepers revenues from its user
base equal Bu M(>; x).
2.2 Effect of Paid Placement
Internet search engines execute a users search query on a database index and typically return a set of results ranked according
to their relevance score. Given these results, the user selects specific content providers in the list for further transactions. It is well
known that the ranking of a result term is strongly correlated with the probability that the user will follow up on the result term
(McLuhan 2000).  Commercial content providers are interested in clickthroughs and conversion rates, i.e., the likelihood that a
search engine user will enter into a commercial transaction with the content provider.  For this reason, content providers have an
incentive for paid placement:  to pay the search engine in order to be included, ranked highly, or prominently featured in the
search result (USA Today 2000). In practice, this may mean a higher relevance score, a featured listing, or perhaps even a
guaranteed retrieval for certain search terms.
What is the impact of paid placement on a search engines perceived quality? Here we assume that search engines cannot hide
the fact that they perform paid placement, because this does not define a long run equilibrium (users will finally perceive the bias,
or it may cause serious legal issues as did pay-for-play in the radio industry) (Sullivan 2002b).   Articles in the business press and
data from commercial research firms suggest that paid placement strategies have a negative impact on a search engines perceived
quality and credibility. Goodman (2000) argues that search engines must act as refereesfair arbiters of relevance or they will
lose market share.  Since loss of market share causes a fall in advertising revenue, search engines must trade off potential revenues
from paid placement with those from advertising.
To model the effect of paid placement, suppose that the search engine offers priority placement to content providers who pay a
placement fee (.  Providers that receive preferential treatment expect additional profits due to increased transactions with users.
As mentioned earlier, paid placement is more beneficial when there are only few sites that receive such preferential treatment:
more paid listings reduce the additional benefits due to increased competition. Therefore, we use a specific quality adjusted linear
demand function (as in Banker et al. 1998) to represent the demand for paid placement by the content providers. We write the
demand function implicitly as ( = bM  cx, where M, the market coverage of the search engine, can be understood as the search
engines quality measure from the content providers perspective, and b and c are nonnegative constants. The search engine now
gets additional revenues Bp = ( A x.
2.3 Search Engines Profit Function
The search engine obtains revenues from two sources:  third party firms and paid placement.  The first type of revenue ,¼1 = s
¢ M(>; x), is a function of the search engines market coverage, M(>; x), and profit rate brought by each user, s.  The search
engines placement revenue is Bp = ( A x. Substituting for ( and rearranging terms, we get 
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¼p = (bM(>; x) ¡ ex)x = bM(>; x))x ¡ ex2
The search engines total profits are B = Bu  +Bp and it aims to choose the optimal fraction of paid placement xin order to
maximize B.
2.4 Literature Review
In related work, Bhargava and Choudhary (2001) and Corbett and Karmarkar (1999) study the case where an information
intermediary has the option to charge subscription fees for customers and listing fees for suppliers. However, Bhargava and
Choudhary consider only a one-sided network benefit, and their model does not incorporate advertising revenue. Corbett and
Karmarkar model two-sided network benefits, but assume homogeneous content providers and do not incorporate advertising
revenue. Baye and Morgan (2001) applied a game theoretic model to study a similar question.  None of these papers consider the
possibility that the gatekeeper may bias its outputs due to payments from content providers.  Dewan et al. (2002) study the
problem faced by content Web sites to balance content and advertising by an infinite horizon control program. Gabszewicz et al.
(1999) analyze the case of two TV channels competing in both the audience market and the advertising market.  In both of these
models, however, advertising is the only revenue source, hence no trade-off between different resources is considered. 
3 OPTIMAL PLACEMENT STRATEGY
Solving first-order conditions for the search engines profit function, we see that the optimal degree of independence x* is given
by
sMx(>; x) + bM(>; x)-(2e ¡ b)x = 0 (1)
It can be verified that the profit function is concave and that the optimal x* given by (1) satisfies second-order conditions for
optimality. To understand Eq. (1), we rearrange the terms and get:
( bM(>; x)  ex))x = sMx(>; x))x  (x)x (2)
This shows that with a small amount of change in the paid placement strategy, the left hand side represents the increase in the
placement revenue.  The first term on the right hand side is the fall in revenue from lower demand and the second term is the fall
in revenue from a lower placement fee.  This equation shows that the marginal benefit from paid placement should be balanced
by the marginal cost in the optimal situation.
Next we examine the sensitivity of the placement strategy to exogenous factors and factors that the information gatekeeper can
control. One of the controllable factors of the information gatekeeper is its quality of service. The gatekeeper can improve quality
via investments in these areas. Intuitively, the gatekeeper could give up some placement revenues, improve >, attract more
customers and get more advertisement revenues. What is the trade-off between the search engines quality and the placement
revenue?
Proposition 1:  An increase in the gatekeepers technological or service level > allows it to increase its total profit. If |Mx(>; x)/
M(>; x)| < b/s, it is allowed to increase its bias level as well; otherwise its optimal bias level should be reduced.
We note that the increase in paid placement links is accompanied by a reduction in the placement fee, yet there is an unambiguous
increase in placement revenues since the placement level moves closer to its ideal (i.e., the level the gatekeeper would set if there
were no negative effect on users). Thus, the search engine must examine potential investments in quality > based on its impact
not only on user-based revenues but also on revenues from paid placement.
Next, we consider the impact of per user profit. How do changes in s affect the search engines paid placement strategy?
Proposition 2:  An increase in per user profit, s, decreases the fraction of paid placements x*, hence the gatekeeper increases its
market coverage M. The search engine also improves its total profits B.
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To understand this result, consider the gatekeepers tradeoff between its two revenue sources. As s increases, the potential for
advertising revenue increases, hence a partial sacrifice of revenues brought by users imposes a greater cost on the gatekeeper.
Therefore, it reduces its level of paid placement in order to provide greater utility to users, and captures a greater percentage of
potential advertising revenues.
4 COMPETITION BETWEEN GATEKEEPERS
Now consider two gatekeepers in the market. Suppose that originally they are endowed with the same quality and capture equal
market share in the users market. Now they have the option to adapt to a paid placement strategy. Let x1 and x2 represent the bias
levels of the two engines. Users are heterogeneous in their tolerance toward bias. Those users with high tolerance toward bias
(higher than Max{x1, x2}  are indifferent to the services provided by either gatekeeper, so we assume that this segment is equally
likely to visit either service. Those with a lower bias will prefer the less biased search engine.
Since the two gatekeepers have the same technological or service level, we omit > in the demand function and write it as M(x1, xj),
which represents the demand for the gatekeeper with bias level x1 when the competing gatekeeper has bias level xj. The gatekeeper
with the higher bias splits, with its competitor, the demand from users with tolerance levels greater than its bias. The engine with
lower bias gets its own market for customers with lower tolerance toward bias, plus the market shared with the engine with higher
bias levels. Hence we write the demand function as:


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
>
≤−
=
jii
jiji
ji
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Where M(x1), and M(xj), are the demand functions presented in the monopoly analysis, and represent the demand when there is
only one gatekeeper with bias levels x1 or xj respectively.
Consider gatekeeper 1. If x1 > x2, it captures half its monopoly market,
M1(x1; x2) =1/2 M(x1)
and °1 =12M(x1) ¡ ex1. The gatekeepers profit function is:
¼1 = s12M(x1) +12bM(x1)x1 ¡ ex21 (3)
On the other hand, if x1 A x2,  then search engine 1 has a larger market share:
M1(x1; x2) =M(x1)  M(x2). 2
1
−
Then °1 = bM(x1)¡12M(x2)¡ex1. Given the competitors bias level x2, the gatekeepers profit function is:
¼1 = sM(x1) ¡ s12M(x2) + bM(x1)x1 ¡ b12M(x2)x1 ¡ ex21 (4)
Now we solve gatekeeper 1s best response to gatekeeper 2s bias level, they are the solution to the first order condition to Eq. (3)
and Eq. (4) respectively. Since the two gatekeepers are symmetric, the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is determined by:
 (5)2111212
*
1 )()(maxarg xexxMbxMsx −+⋅=
so that the two gatekeepers choose the same bias level, obtain equal market share, and make the same profits.
How does this competition affects the users and content providers welfare?
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Search engine 1s 
best response
Search engine 
2s best response
Nash 
Equilibrium
Proposition 3:  The bias level of the two gatekeepers is less than the bias level if they are monopolists.  The competition among
search engines increases users welfare, while the total gatekeeper surplus and the total surplus of content providers are both
reduced.
Figure 2 demonstrate the Nash equilibrium. 
Figure 2.  Nash Equilibrium
5 GATEKEEPERS WITH DIFFERENT QUALITY
Now consider the case where the gatekeepers were endowed with different quality levels in the beginning.  If they face the choice
of choosing their own paid placement strategy, what bias levels are they going to use?
Similar with the case above, the demand function of the gatekeeper is:
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where M(>i, xi) represents the demand when there is only one gatekeeper with quality level >i  and bias level xi, or we can view
it as one indirect measure of the composite quality level of one gatekeeper. This is to say that the one gatekeeper with higher
composite quality measure will gain a larger market share, while the lower composite quality gatekeeper only serves part of the
market with higher tolerance level toward bias.
Without loss of generality, lets assume that >1 > >2.  Following the same logic as before, taking >1 and >2 given, we get compute
the equilibrium bias level of each gatekeeper. It may be seen here that x1 is increasing in >1 and x2 as before, but is decreasing in
>2. More specifically,
Proposititon 4:  Multiple equilibria exist. Define the market responsiveness with respect to bias g  to be . The sufficient
M
x
x
M
⋅
∂
∂
condition to have an equilibrium where x1 < x2  is . More than one equilibria may exists where x1 > x2 , where
21
2|| ξξ
ξ
ε
+
−> b
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Search engine 1s 
best response
Search engine 2s 
best response
Nash 
Equilibrium
Search engine 1s 
best response
Search engine 2s 
best response
Nash 
Equilibrium
either M1 $ M2 or M1 < M2 , depending upon the market situation.
Figures 3 and 4 show the cases when the  and  .
21
2|| ξξ
ξ
ε
+
−> b
21
2|| ξξ
ξ
ε
+
−< b
The intuition behind this result is that, if the market responsiveness toward bias is great, then the higher quality gatekeeper (1)
will have a lower bias level to maintain a good reputation, and this is more possible when the two gatekeepers quality levels are
not obviously differentiated.  But if the market is not sensitive to the bias, then gatekeeper 1 can have higher bias level because
its quality is better, and this is more possible when the two gatekeepers quality levels are greatly differentiated.
Figure 3.  Market Responsiveness to Bias is Greater
Figure 3.  Market Responsiveness to Bias is Less
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6 SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS
Until now, we have only considered the profit maximizing problem for the gatekeeper(s). Here we just provide some primary
results.  The the details are available from the authors. 
Proposition 6:  When there is only one gatekeeper, whether or not the gatekeepers profit maximizing bias level is greater than
the socially optimal bias level will be determined by the consumer market responsiveness.  When there are two gatekeepers, it
is socially optimally for them to set bias levels such that one is greater than the monopoly case and one less than the monopoly
case.
7 CONCLUSION
This article considers paid placement information gatekeepers and analyzes the optimal strategy in the specific context of Internet
search engines. On the one hand, paid placement appears to be a financial necessity, embraced by most major Web search engines.
On the other, paid placement can hurt the search engines market share and its potential for revenues brought by users. We have
developed a mathematical model for optimal design of a paid placement strategy, examined this tradeoff, and analyzed sensitivity
of the placement strategy to users perceived disutility, the service quality of the gatekeeper, and the advertising rate. We also
considered the case where there is competition between search engines. We showed that when the search engines are otherwise
identical in quality, they will choose the same bias level. But for heterogeneous search engines with different qualities, the
equilibrium outcome depends largely on the users cognitive or other limitations on the number of search results they effectively
consider.
While this research is set in the context of Internet search engines, our model and results apply more generally to many other
contexts that share similar characteristics as search engines. This broader category, often called information gatekeepers,
intermediates between a set of users (buyers or consumers) and a set of products (content providers or vendors).  Baye and Morgan
(2001) argue that modern markets for information tend to be dominated by information gatekeepers that specialize in collating,
aggregating, and searching the massive amounts of information available on the Web and that can often charge consumers,
advertisers, and information providers for their ability to acquire and transmit information. Wise and Morrison (2001) emphasize
the increasing role of information gatekeepers in todays economy, noting that in business-to-business markets, value has shifted
from the product itself to information about the product.  Specific categories of information gatekeepers to which our work
applies include recommender systems (e.g., Amazon.com), comparison shopping services (e.g., mySimon.com), e-marketplaces
and exchanges (e.g., FreeMarkets), and more traditional information gatekeepers such as investment advisors and television
networks. Like search engines, many information gatekeepers generate user-based revenues, but also seek to obtain revenues from
their provider-base by offering some form of preferential placement. For example, some Internet booksellers are influenced by
advertising fees in determining their bestseller lists. Similarly, certain Internet exchanges provide preferential service (such as
real time notification or favorable recommendation to buyers) to some clients in return for higher fees.
Our models can be extended to examine conditions under which the information gatekeeper will begin to charge users, and
specifically the case where the gatekeeper differentiates between users by offering two versions: a fee-based premium service
with no bias in the query results and a free basic version with paid placement bias. The fee-based premium version will bring
additional user revenues to the search engine; however, it may reduce placement revenues because paid placement becomes less
attractive to content providers. In addition, the search engines market coverage and placement fee may change as well, and the
models can be used to determine if it is optimal for the gatekeeper to offer differentiated service. Similar models can be developed
to examine the impact of differentiation based on advertising. Some search engines have already began to offer fee-based premium
search services that contain no advertising. If this is the trend, it may eventually change peoples view of Internet search engines
as a free resource for fair information.
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